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ABSTRACT
Modern applications often involve processing of sensitive informa-
tion. However, the lack of privilege separation within the user space
leaves sensitive application secret such as cryptographic keys just
as unprotected as a "hello world" string. Cutting-edge hardware-
supported security features are being introduced. However, the
features are often vendor-specific or lack compatibility with older
generations of the processors. The situation leaves developers with
no portable solution to incorporate protection for the sensitive
application component.
We propose LOTRx86, a fundamental and portable approach
for user-space privilege separation. Our approach creates a more
privileged user execution layer called PrivUser by harnessing the
underused intermediate privilege levels on the x86 architecture. The
PrivUser memory space, a set of pages within process address space
that are inaccessible to user mode, is a safe place for application
secrets and routines that access them. We implement the LOTRx86
ABI that exports the privcall interface to users to invoke secret
handling routines in PrivUser. This way, sensitive application oper-
ations that involve the secrets are performed in a strictly controlled
manner. The memory access control in our architecture is privilege-
based, accessing the protected application secret only requires a
change in the privilege, eliminating the need for costly remote pro-
cedure calls or change in address space. We evaluated our platform
by developing a proof-of-concept LOTRx86-enabled web server that
employs our architecture to securely access its private key during
an SSL connection. We conducted a set of experiments including a
performance measurement on the PoC on both Intel and AMD PCs,
and confirmed that LOTRx86 incurs only a limited performance
overhead.
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1 INTRODUCTION
User applications today are prone to software attacks, and yet are
often monolithically structured or lack privilege separation. As
a result, adversaries who have successfully exploited a software
vulnerability in an application can access sensitive in-process code
or data that are irrelevant to the exploited module or part of the
application. Today’s applications often contain secrets that are too
critical to reside in thememory alongwith the rest of the application
contents, as we have witnessed in the incident of HeartBleed [20,
45].
The conventional software privilege model that coarsely divides
the system privilege into only two levels (user-level and kernel-
level) has failed to provide a fundamental solution that can support
privilege separation in user applications. As a result, critical appli-
cation secrets such as cryptographic information are essentially
treated no differently than a "hello world" string in user memory
space. When the control flow of a running user context is compro-
mised, there is no access control left to prevent the hijacked context
to access arbitrary memory addresses.
Many approaches have been introduced to mitigate the chal-
lenging issue within the boundaries of the existing application
memory protection mechanisms provided by the operating sys-
tem. A number of works proposed using the process abstraction
as a unit of protection by separating a program into multiple pro-
cesses [7, 29, 41]. The fundamental idea is to utilize the process
separation mechanism provided by the OS; these work achieve
privilege separation by splitting a single program into multiple
processes. However, this process-level separation incurs a signifi-
cant overhead due to the cost of the inter-process communication
(IPC) between the processes or address space switching that incur
TLB flushes. Also, the coarse unit of separation still leaves a large
attack surface for attackers. The direction has advanced through
a plethora of works on the topic. One prominent aspect of the ad-
vancements is the granularity of protection. Thread-level protection
schemes [6, 24, 44] have reduced the protection granularity com-
pared to the process-level separation schemes while still suffering
from performance overhead from page table modifications. Shreds
presented fine-grained in-process memory protection using a mem-
ory partitioning feature that has long been present in ARM called
Memory Domains [11]. However, the feature has been deprecated
in the 64-bit execution mode of the ARM architecture (AARCH64).
In the more recent years, a number of processor architecture
revisions and academic works have taken a more fundamental
approach to provide in-process protection; Intel has introduced
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to its new x86 processors to pro-
tect sensitive application and code and data from the rest of the
application as well as the possibly malicious kernel [4, 14]. Intel also
offers hardware-assisted in-process memory safety and protection
features [13, 15] and AMD has announced the plans to embed a
similar feature to its future generations of x86 processors [19]. How-
ever, the support for the new processor features are fragmented;
not only that the features are not inter-operable across processors
from different vendors (Intel, AMD), they are also only available
on the newer processors. Hypervisor-based application memory
protection [10, 35] may serve to be a more portable solution, consid-
ering the widespread adaption of hypervisors nowadays. However,
it is not reasonable for a developer to assume that her users are
using a virtual machine.
The situation presents complications for developers who need to
consider the portability as well as the security of the sensitive data
her program processes. Therefore, we argue that there is a need
for an approach that provides a basis for an in-process privilege
separation based on only the portable features of the processor.
An in-process memory separation should not require a complete
address space switching to access the protected memory or costly
page table modifications.
In this paper, we propose a novel x86 user-mode privilege sep-
aration architecture called The Lord of the x86 Rings (LOTRx86)
architecture. Our architecture proposes a drastically different, yet
portable approach for user privilege separation on x86. While the
existing approaches sought to retrofit the memory protection mech-
anisms within the boundaries of the OS kernel’s support, we pro-
pose the creation of a more privileged user layer called PrivUser
that protects sensitive application code and data from the normal
user mode. For this objective, LOTRx86 harnesses the underused
x86 intermediate Rings (Ring1 and Ring2) with our unique design
that satisfies security requirements that define a distinct privilege
layer. The PrivUsermemory space is a subset of a process memory
space that is accessible to when the process context is in PrivUser
mode but inaccessible when in user mode. In our architecture, user
memory access control is privileged-based. Therefore, the architec-
ture does not require costly run-time page table manipulations nor
address space switching.
We also implement the LOTRx86 ABI that exports the privcall
interface that supports PrivUser layer invocation from user layer.
To draw an analogy, the syscall interface is a controlled invocation
of kernel services that involve kernel’s exclusive rights on sensitive
system operations. In our architecture, PrivUser holds an exclusive
right to application secrets and sensitive routines with a program,
and user layer must invoke privcalls to enter PrivUser mode
and perform sensitive operations involving the secrets in a strictly
controlled way. Our architecture allows developers to protect appli-
cations secret within the PrivUser memory space and also write
privcall routines that that can securely process the application
secret. We developed a kernel module that adds the support for the
privcallABI to the Linux kernel (lotr-kmod). In addition, we pro-
vide a library (liblotr) that provides the privcall interface to the
user programs and C macros that enable declaration of privcall
routines, a modified C library for the building the PrivUser side
(lotr-libc), and a tool for building LOTRx86-enabled program
(lotr-build).
We implemented a prototype of our architecture that is com-
patible with both Intel and AMD’s x86 processors. Based on our
prototype, we developed a proof-of-concept LOTRx86-enabled web
server. In our PoC, the web server’s private key is protected in the
PrivUser memory space and the use of the key (e.g., sign a mes-
sage with the key) is only allowed through our privcall interface.
In our PoC web server, the in-memory private key is inaccessible
outside the privcall routines that are invoked securely, hence ar-
bitrary access to the key is automatically thwarted (i.e., HeartBleed).
The evaluation of the PoC and other evaluations are conducted on
both Intel and AMD PCs. We summarize the contributions of our
LOTRx86 architecture as the following:
• We propose a portable privileged user mode architecture for
sensitive application code and data protection that does not
require address switching or run-time page table manipula-
tion.
• We introduce the privcall ABI that allows user layer to
invoke the privcall routines in a strictly controlled way. We
also provide necessary software for building an LOTRx86-
enabled software.
• We developed a PoC LOTRx86-enabled web server to demon-
strate the protection of in-memory private key during SSL
connection.
2 BACKGROUND: THE X86 PRIVILEGE
ARCHITECTURE
The LOTRx86 architecture design leverages the x86 privilege struc-
tures in a unique way. Hence, it is necessary that we explain the
x86 privilege system before we go further into the LOTRx86 archi-
tecture design. In this section, we briefly describe the x86 privilege
concepts focusing on the topics that are closely related to this paper.
2.1 The Ring Privileges
Modern operating systems on the x86 architecture adapt the two
privilege level model in which user programs run in Ring3 and
kernel in Ring0. The x86 architecture, in fact, supports four privilege
layers – Ring0 through Ring3 where Ring0 is the highest privilege
on the system. The x86 architecture’s definition of privilege is
closely tied to a feature called segmentation.
Segmentation divides virtualmemory spaces into segmentswhich
are defined by a base address, a limit, and a Descriptor Privilege Level
(DPL) that indicates the required privilege level for accessing the
segment. A segment is defined by segment descriptor in eitherGlobal
Descriptor Table (GDT) or Local Descriptor Table (LDT). The privi-
lege of an executing context is defined by a 16-bit data structure
called segment selector loaded in the code segment register (%cs).
The segment selector contains an index to the code segment in
the descriptor table, a bit field to signify which descriptor table it
is referring to (GDT/LDT), and a 2-bit field to represent the Cur-
rent Privilege Level (CPL). The CPL in %cs is synonymous to the
context’s current Ring privilege number.
The privilege level (the Ring number) dictates an executing con-
text’s permission to perform sensitive system operations and mem-
ory access. Notably, the execution of privileged instructions is only
allowed to contexts running with Ring0 privilege. Also, the x86
paging only permits Ring0-2 to access supervisor pages.
2.2 Memory Protection
Operating systems use paging to manage memory access control,
and the segmented memory model has long been an obsolete mem-
ory management technique. However, the paging-based flat mem-
ory model, which has become the standard memory management
scheme, uses the Ring privilege levels for page access control. The
x86 paging defines two-page access privilege: User and Supervisor.
The Ring 3 can only access User pages while Ring 0-2 are allowed to
access Supervisor pages1. In general, the pages in the kernel mem-
ory space are mapped as Superuser such that they are protected
from user applications. Table 1 outlines the privileges of each Ring
level.
Algorithm 1 x86 callgate operation
1: procedure CG:Rn → Rm (SEGSEL)
2: DESC_T BL ← if SEGSEL.t i ? LDT : GDT
3: CG ← DESC_T BL[SEGSEL.idx ]
4: if n > CG .RMPL or n ≤m then
5: return DEN IED
6: end if
7: Save(%RIP,%CS,%RSP,%SS) ▷ Save caller context in temp space
8: %SS ← TSS [m].SS ▷ Load new context to be used in Ringm
9: %RSP ← TSS [m].RSP
10: %CS ← CG .TarдetCS ▷ Privilege Escalation: n →m
11: %RIP ← CG .TarдetEntrance
12: Push SavedSS
13: Push SavedRSP
14: Push SavedCS
15: Push SavedRI P
16: RESUME
17: end procedure
Algorithm 2 x86 long return instruction (%lret)
1: procedure Long Return
2: ▷ can only return to equal or lower privileges
3: if DestPr iv < CurrentPr iv then
4: return DEN IED
5: end if
6: %RIP ← Pop() ▷ target addr
7: %CS ← Pop() ▷ target ring privilege
8: tempRSP ← Pop()
9: tempSS ← Pop()
10: %RSP ← tempRSP
11: %SS ← tempRSP
12: RESUME
13: end procedure
2.3 Moving Across Rings
The x86 architecture provides a number of mechanisms by which a
running context can explicitly invoke privilege escalation for sys-
tem services. While the privilege of the context is clearly specified
in its %cs register, its contents cannot be directly altered (e.g., mov
%eax, %cs) but indirectly with special instructions. The x86 ISA pro-
vides special instructions that allow switching of the code segment
1Intel and AMD have introduced a CPU feature called Supervisor Mode Execution
Prevention (SMEP) and Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP). SMEP prevents
contexts in Ring 0-2 from executing code in User pages, effectively preventing ret2usr
style of attacks. SMAP prevents the kernel from accessing user pages as data [12, 27]
Table 1: Privileges of Four Rings on x86
Ring0 Ring1 Ring2 Ring3
Privileged instruction ✓ × × ×
Supervisor page access ✓ ✓ ✓ ×
as well as the program counter, namely the inter-segment control
transfers instructions. For instance, The execution of the syscall
instruction elevates the CPL of the context to Ring0 by loading the
%cs with the kernel code segment. It also loads the PC register
(%rip) with system call entrance point in the kernel. In modern
operating system kernels, only the instructions that invoke system
calls are frequently used. However, it is necessary that we explain
the concepts and mechanisms of the inter-segment control transfer
mechanisms that were introduced along with the four Ring system
long before the instructions dedicated to invoking system calls.
Privilege escalation. Our design makes use of the callgate
mechanism for privilege escalation, a feature present in all modern
(since the introduction of the protected mode) x86 processors. A
callgate descriptor can be defined at the descriptor tables to create
an inter-privilege tunnel between the Rings. Specifically, it defines
the target code segment, whose privilege will be referred to as
the Target Privilege Level (TPL), a Target Addr, and a Required Min-
imum Privilege Level (RMPL). A context can pass through a call
gate via a long call instruction2 that takes a segment selector as its
operand. The long call instruction first performs privilege checks
when it confirms that the operand given is a reference to a callgate.
A callgate demands its caller’s CPL (the current Ring number) to be
numerically equal to or less than (higher privilege) the callgate’s
RMPL. Also, the caller’s CPL cannot be numerically less than the
TPL of the callgate. In other words, a control transfer through a
callgate does not allow privilege de-escalation. If these privilege
checks fail, the context receives a general protection fault and is
forced to terminate. If the privilege check is successful, the privi-
lege of the context is escalated, and the program counter (%rip), as
well as the stack pointer (%rsp), are loaded with the target address.
A long call instruction results in privilege escalation if and only
if it references a valid callgate that defines a privilege escalation
and minimum privilege required to enter the callgate. Therefore
a callgate is a controlled control transfer that facilitates privilege
escalation. We provide a pseudocode that describes the set of opera-
tions performed at the callgate in Algorithm 1. Note that we denote
a control flow transfer where a context executing in Ringn enters
Ringm through a callgate using the following notation:
CG :Rn→Rm , where n ≤ CG .RMPL andm ≤ n
Privilege de-escalation. A context can return to its original
privilege mode with a long call instruction3 after privilege escala-
tion. A long return instruction restores the caller’s context that has
been saved by the long call instruction as shown in Algorithm 2. It
should be noted that a long return instruction only checks if the
destination privilege level is numerically equal to or greater (lower
privilege) by referencing the saved caller context. In fact, a long
return instruction has no way of knowing if the saved context on
the stack is indeed saved by the callgate. Hence, the long return
instruction and similar return instructions such as iret can be
2"lcall" in AT&T syntax and "call far" in Intel syntax
3"lret" in AT&T syntax and "retf" in Intel syntax
thought of as privilege de-escalating control transfer instructions
that pop the contents that are presumably saved registers. In this
sense, a long return and its variants provide non-controlled control
transfer mechanism that is used to de-escalate privileges. We denote
this specific type of control transfer where privilege is de-escalated
(or stays the same) fromm to n as the following:
Rm→Rn , wherem ≤ n
Inter-bitness control transfer. Inter-bitness control transfer
is another type of an x86 control transfer that needs to be explained
before we introduce our design. The x86-64 architecture provides
32-bit compatibility mode within the x86-64 (AMD’s amd64 or In-
tel’s IA-32e architecture). As with the privilege level, the bitness
is also defined by the currently active code segment descriptor.
When a context is executing in a code segment whose descriptor
has the L flag set, the processor operates in the 64-bit instruction
architecture (e.g., registers are 64-bit, and 64-bit instructions are
used). Otherwise, the context executes as if the processor is an
x86-32 architecture processor. The bitness switching, although it
changes the processor (current CPU core) execution mode, is no
different than any other inter-segment control transfers with one
exception: a callgate cannot target a 32-bit code segment. This is a
perk that came with the introduction of the x86-64 implementation.
In summary, we denote 32-bit code segments with a x32 suffix as
the following:
Rn_x32→Rm
3 ATTACK MODEL AND SECURITY
GUARANTEES
3.1 Attack model
We assume that the adversary is either an outside entity or a non-
administrator user (i.e., no access to root account) who seeks to
extract sensitive application code or data. The adversary may have
an exploitable vulnerability in the victimized application that could
lead to arbitrary code execution and direct access to application
secret. We assume such vulnerabilities are present when the app
has fully initialized and is servicing its user. However, we presume
that the program is safe from the adversary during the initialization
phase of the application.We also assume a non-compromised kernel
that can support the LOTRx86 architecture. Our design requires
the presence of a kernel module that depends on kernel capabilities
such as marking memory regions supervisor or installing custom
segment descriptors. Also, our design includes Enter/Exit gates that
facilitate the control transfer between the PrivUser and normal
user mode. The gates amount to about 50 lines of assembly code
and we assume that they are verifiable and absent of vulnerabilities.
3.2 Security guarantees
Our work focus on providing developers with an underlying ar-
chitecture, a new user privilege layer, which can be leveraged to
protect application secrets and also program routines that access
secrets securely. Using our architecture, we guarantee that a context
in normal user mode cannot directly access a region protected (as
a part of the PrivUser memory space) even in the presence of vul-
nerabilities. The adversary cannot jump into an arbitrary location
in the PrivUsermemory space to leak secrets since LOTRx86 lever-
ages the x86 privilege structures to allow only controlled invocation
of routines that handle sensitive information.
On the other hand, we do not focus on the security of the code
that executes in our PrivUsermode. We also argue that protection
of application secret in the presence of a vulnerability in the trusted
code base (PrivUser code in our case) is an unrealistic security ob-
jective for any privilege separation scheme or even hardware-based
Trusted Execution Environments [14, 34]. For instance, a recent
work [32] proved that vulnerabilities inside SGX could be used to
disclose protected application secrets. However, we do guarantee
that the PrivUser layer is architecturally confined to its privilege
that it cannot modify kernel memory nor infringe upon the ker-
nel (Ring0) privileges even in the presence of a vulnerability in the
PrivUser code. As we will explain in the coming section (section 4),
this is a pivotal part of our architecture design. The privilege struc-
tures and gates that exactly achieve this security guarantee is one
of the key contributions of this paper.
4 LOTRX86 DESIGN
The primary goal of the LOTRx86 design is to establish a new user
memory protection and access mechanism through the introduction
of new user mode privilege called PrivUser. Our design eliminates
the necessity for page table switching or manipulation; the access
to the protected memory regions is granted based on the privilege.
Our architecture approaches the problem of application memory
safety at a fundamental level. Instead of leveraging the existing
OS-supported protection mechanisms, we create another privilege
distinction within the user program execution model that resembles
the user vs. kernel privilege.
Developers can write sensitive memory handling routines into
PrivUser layer, then simply place a privcall in place to invoke a
routine that she defined. Below is the privcall interface that we
provide to developers:
privcall(PRIVCALL_NR ,...);
The privcall interface and its ABI is modeled after the Linux
kernel’s system call interface. The routine in PrivUser is identified
with a number (e.g., PRIV_USEPKEY=3). For developers who have
experience in POSIX system programming, using the privcalls
to perform operations that involve application secret is intuitive.
Privileged-based memory access control. Our approach in-
troduces a privilege-based memory access control, and it offers clear
advantages over the existing process and thread level approaches.
The cost of the remote procedure calls for bridging two independent
processes, or the cost of page table manipulation is eliminated. In
our architecture, the memory access permissions do not change
when the application secret needs to be accessed. Instead, the priv-
ilege of the execution mode is elevated to obtain access to the
protected memory.
Secure invocation. privcall is a single control transfer in-
struction (lcall), bywhich a context enters PrivUsermode through
the LOTRx86 Enter gate and returns upon finishing the privcall
routine. Due to this design, the adversary cannot jump into an
arbitrary location with the PrivUser privilege. Therefore, our ar-
chitecture does not experience the security complications inherent
to enable and disable models [11].
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(a) LOTRx86 application memory access map: PrivUser mem-
ory regions are mapped Supervisor protected by paging when
in User-Mode(Ring3). In PrivUser-Mode (Ring2), in-place mem-
ory segmentation protects kernel and (optionally) normal user-
mode memory.
PrivUser Mode 
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(b) LOTRx86 gate design: implements inescapable segmentation
enforcement through meticulously designed privilege and gate
structures. LOTRx86 uses Ring1 as Gate-mode in and out of the
PrivUser-mode that executes in Ring2-x32.
Figure 1: LOTRx86 architecture overview
Portability. LOTRx86 does not rely on new processor features
for memory protection [13–15, 19]. Instead, we re-purpose the
underused privilege layers to implement PrivUser. Hence, our ar-
chitecture is compatible across all generations of x86-64 processors.
As we will present in section 6, we evaluated our architecture and
a PoC on both Intel and AMD’s x86-64 processors.
4.1 Establishing PrivUsermemory space
We face formidable challenges in the process of establishing the
PrivUser layer. Our design creates a distinct executionmode (PrivUser
execution mode) and its address space (PrivUser address space) for
PrivUser layer. However, the resulting PrivUser layer must be in-
termediate, meaning that its address space should not be accessible
by a user mode context, and at the same time, PrivUser execution
mode must not be able to access the kernel address space. However,
the x86 paging architecture provides only two memory privilege
distinction: U-pages and S-pages. The memory segmentation fea-
ture that existed in x86-32 is deprecated in x86-64, eliminating an
additional memory access control mechanism to paging.
In summary, PrivUser layer must satisfy the two fundamen-
tal memory access security requirements (M-SR1 and M-SR2) to
function as an intermediate layer.
M-SR1.User mode must not be able to access PrivUsermemory
space
M-SR2. PrivUser mode must not be able to access kernel mem-
ory space
Satisfying M-SR1.We satisfy M-SR1 by mapping all pages that
belong to PrivUser as S-pages to protect a user mode context from
accessing PrivUser code and data. As a result, PrivUser memory
space that is mapped as S-page is accessible to PrivUsermode, but
not to user mode. Now, we see that we are already using both of
the two privilege distinction recognized by the paging system, and
we are unable to protect the kernel from PrivUser mode.
Satisfying M-SR2. LOTRx86 adapts a scheme that temporarily
enables segmentation when a certain code segment is in use; we
enforce PrivUser mode to be a segmentation-enforced execution
mode by defining it as a 32-bit segmentation-enabled code segment
as shown in Table 2. This way, entering PrivUser mode changes
not only the currently active code segment but also the bitness
of the execution mode. That is, when user mode enters PrivUser
mode through privcall the execution mode is set to the 32bit
compatibility mode. As a result, we can enforce segmentation to
set boundaries for the powerful PrivUser mode (Ring2) that are
capable of accessing S-pages. The resulting memory access map of
the three executionmode is illustrated in Figure 1a.With our design,
the PrivUser memory space serves as a functionally intermediate
memory space for PrivUser.
Remaining challenge. However, we found that satisfying M-
SR2 is a non-trivial issue. The segmentation enforcement alone is
not sufficient for ensuring M-SR2. As mentioned in subsection 3.2,
we must guarantee that the PrivUser layer has architecturally
well-defined memory boundary against kernel; we must ensure
that all memory access under any circumstances should not be able
to affect kernel. The challenge is that we must carefully inspect all
possible inter-segment control transfer from PrivUser mode, to
verify that PrivUsermode cannot enter a state where it can access
kernel memory.
4.2 Inescapable segmentation enforcement
LOTRx86 needs to guarantee that PrivUsermode is architecturally
confined. Hence, we need to ensure it cannot escape the segmenta-
tion to access kernel memory. More specifically, we need to ensure
that no non-controlled (i.e., not through callgates) inter-segment
control transfer paths out of the PrivUser mode arrives in a seg-
ment that is 1. has a Ring privilege numerically less than 3 (can
access S-pages), 2. and is a 64-bit segment (no segmentation is en-
forced). We denote this control transfer security requirement for
the enforcement of inescapable segmentation as CT-SR, and we
explain how our privilege definitions (i.e., entries in LDT) and our
gate structure (Figure 1b) satisfy the above requirement.
CT-SR. R2_x32↛Re_x64 where e < 3: there must be no possible
non-controlled control transfer from PrivUser mode (R2_x32) to a
64-bit Ring privilege e (escape) that is capable of accessing S-page
access privilege
Hardware constraint and gate mode. Along with the CT-SR,
there is an x86-64 specific perk that has been proved to be a con-
straint in our design. The x86-64 mode (both 64-bit mode and the
32-bit compatibility mode) only supports a 64-bit mode callgate
which is an extended version of its counterpart that existed in
x86-32. Specifically, it does not allow the target code segment of a
callgate to be a 32-bit segment. This implies that an inter-bitness
control transfer through callgate is not supported both ways; while
CG :Rn_x32→Rm is possible,CG :Rm→Rn_x32 is an invalid callgate
definition. Due to this constraint C, a privilege escalation and a
switch to the 32-bit mode cannot be achieved in a single callgate
transfer. Therefore, we that we need a separate 64-bit Gate mode
segment to elevate privilege, then enter the 32-bit PrivUser mode.
However, there exists a more important reason for the existence of
the 64-bit Gate mode and that its privilege Rд must be higher than
that of PrivUser mode (Rp ).
C. CG :Rn↛Rm_x32 : callgate cannot target a 32-bit code seg-
ment
Inspecting non-controlled control transfer routes. As we
explained in section 2, an uncontrolled inter-segment control trans-
fer can be made to jump to a less privileged code segment without
any security checks. Therefore we must rigorously verify all possi-
ble non-controlled transfers from Rp_x32 to all Ring levels e that are
e ≥ 2 (Ring privilege levels that are numerically equal or greater,
meaning equal or lower privilege). First of all, we must make sure
that a context in PrivUser mode cannot arbitrarily jump into an
arbitrary place in Gate mode. In order to prevent a non-controlled
control transfer Rp→Rд , we realize that the gate mode privilege
must be higher (numerically lower in terms of Ring number). Hence
the following property must hold in our design:
P1. д < p (Rд is higher in privilege than Rp ) : privilege of Gate
mode must be higher than that of PrivUser mode
The second possible escape route is to perform a same-privilege
inter-bitness (32bit→ 64bit) inter-segment control flow.We prevent
such route by intentionally not defining a 64-bit code segment for
the Ring level 2. A Ring privilege level in the x86 architecture
come into existence when it is defined in the descriptor table, and a
context loads the segment selector that points to the code segment
through inter-segment control flow instruction. Hence, a Ring level
that is not defined in the descriptor tables, does not exist within the
system. Hence, by only defining a 32-bit code segment for Ring2,
Ring2 becomes a 32-bit only, segmentation enforced Ring level in
our system definition. We denote this property of our privilege
structure design as the following:
P2.  Rp_x64 : 64-bit counterpart of PrivUser mode segment
must not exist
Our privilege definitions and gate structures (Table 2 and Fig-
ure 1b) meet the constraint C. C is satisfied by the Enter gate in
Gate mode. A privcall first enters Gate mode through the CG1
into the Enter Gate (Table 2). At the gate mode, we load the stack
with the following arguments: {PrivUser entry point, PrivUser
code segment selector, PrivUser stack address, PrivUser stack
segment selector}, and then perform a far return lret to enter
PrivUsermode. While this control transfer is made through a non-
controlled control transfer instruction, the Enter gate consisting
of about 30 lines of assembly instructions are guaranteed to be
executed from the beginning by the CG1. In other words, we chain
a non-controlled control transfer with a controlled control transfer
(CG1) to guarantee its correct execution. Our design also satisfies
CT-SR by maintaining the required properties P1 and P2. We chose
Ring1 as the privilege level for Gate mode while enforcing the
segmentation on all PrivUser mode execution by defining only
32-bit segmentation-enforced code segment for the Ring level 2. By
meeting CT-SR, we complete our solution for the establishment of
the PrivUser memory space that satisfies both M-SR1 and M-SR2;
the PrivUser memory space is protected from context running in
the user mode, while PrivUser mode is architecturally bound to
its memory space that it cannot access kernel memory under all
circumstances.
5 PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we explain the prototype of our LOTRx86 archi-
tecture in detail. Our prototype implementation consists of the
following components:
lotr-kmod.We built a Linux kernel module that communicates
with the host process (LOTRx86 enabled process). The module
creates a virtual device interface at /dev/lotr, and an LOTRx86
enabled program communicates with our kernel module with the
ioctl interface. The kernel module builds the PrivUser-space for
the program when requested.
liblotr. The user library liblotr allows developers to the use
of our architecture in the host program, isolate the application
secrets, and implement privcalls that securely access the se-
crets. A developer can initialize the PrivUser-space and utilize
the privcall interface through our user library. The library also
includes tools and scripts for building the executable that runs in
the PrivUser-space.
lotr-libc.We provide a modified version of the musl [1] libc for
building the PrivUser executable. We modified the heap mem-
ory manager such that only S-pages are allocated to the heap
managers used in the PrivUser mode. In this way, we prevent
the leakage of the application secret and the by-products of its
processing to the user space.
lotr-build. lotr-build is a collection of compilation scripts and
tools that help developers in compiling the PrivUser portion of
their application and incorporating it into the host application.
We further explain this procedure later.
5.1 PrivUser mode Initialization
The lotr-kmod kernel module initializes the LOTRx86 infrastruc-
ture such as the Gate-mode, PrivUser mode and control transfer
structures for the host process. The host application is required to
call init_lotr(&req) function from liblotr with an argument
of the struct init_request type during its initialization. The
request structure contains the addresses and sizes of PrivUser
components that lotr-kmod need in its initialization routine. Such
information includes the range of PrivUser code segment, data
segment, the entry point for the PrivUser-space, pages to be used
as a stack in PrivUser, and so forth. The addresses of the segments
are available through the symbols generated by our build tools
during the compile-time, while the stack is allocated through mmap
in liblotr. Additionally, lotr-kmod contains the Enter gate and
Exit gate that are loaded into the kernel memory upon module load.
The lotr-kmod kernel module creates an LDT for the host pro-
cess and writes the segment and callgate descriptors that are used
for the Gate-mode and PrivUser mode. Unlike the GDT, an LDT
is referenced on a per-process basis; an LDT can be created for each
process, and the register that points to the currently active LDT
called ldtr is updated in each context switch. For this reason, the
LOTRx86 descriptors can only be referenced by the host process that
explicitly requested the initialization of the LOTRx86 infrastructure.
lotr-kmod creates the descriptor segments listed in Table 2. A set
of Ring1 code and data segments are used for the Gate-mode, and
Ring2-32bit segment descriptors are loaded as a context enters the
PrivUser mode.
The initialization also set the Gate-mode stack to be loaded at
the Enter callgate. As briefly explained in section 2, the x86 callgate
mechanism finds the address of the new stack for the control trans-
fer at the TSS structure. The TSS structure holds the addresses of
for each Ring levels. In our case, we use two callgates, CG(R3→R1)
and CG(R2_x32→R1), that both require a stack for Ring1. Hence,
we allocate stack space and record the top of the stack in the Ring1
stack field of the TSS (TSS.SP1).
Another important task carried out during the initialization (in
lotr-kmod) is marking the pages that belong to the PrivUser-
space Supervisor pages. The kernel module walks the page tables
and marks PrivUser pages Supervisor by clearing the User bit in
the page table entry. All pages that are marked Supervisors are
maintained in a linked list so they can be reverted or freed when
necessary as the host process terminates.
When all necessary initialization procedures are finished, the
kernel module creates a lock for the host process based on its PID.
From this point on, lotr-kmod ignores additional initialization
request delivered via the ioctl requests from the host to thwart
any possible attempt to compromise the PrivUser-space.
5.2 LOTRx86 ABI
The privcall interface of the LOTRx86 is almost identical to the
syscall interface; privcall follows the x86-64 System V AMD64
ABI system call convention [16]. That is, we use %rax, %rdi, %rsi,
%rdx, %r10, %r8, %r9 registers for passing arguments to the PrivUser
mode, and the return value is stored in %rax. Underneath the sur-
face, however, our unique design enables establishment and secure
use of the PrivUser-space. From here on, we explain each stage of
Type Priv.
Gate-mode CS Code Segment Ring1
Gate-mode DS Data Segment Ring1
PrivUser mode CS Code Segment Ring2-x32
PrivUser mode DS Data Segment Ring2-x32
CG1 CG1 (R3→R1) CPL ≤ 3
CG2 CG2 (R2→R1) CPL ≤ 2
Table 2: LOTRx86 LDT descriptors: by defining segment and
callgate descriptors in LDT, LOTRx86 creates Gate-mode and
PrivUsermode for a process
# Entered from privcall in user mode
LOTREnterGate:
# (a) Allow only Ring 3 to enter this gate
movq 8(% rsp), %r11
cmp $3, %r11
jnz EXIT
# (b) Save User mode(R3) Context
pushq 24(% rsp);
pushq 16(% rsp);
pushq 8(% rsp);
pushq 0(% rsp);
SAVE_REGS ();
# (c) Transfer Arguments into PrivUser Stack
movq $PrivUserStack , %r11;
subq $60 , %r11;
movl $DummyEIP , 0(% r11d);
movq %rax , 4(% r11d);
movq %rdi , 12(% r11d);
movq %rsi , 20(% r11d);
movq %rdx , 28(% r11d);
movq %r10 , 36(% r11d);
movq %r8 , 44(% r11d);
movq %r9 , 52(% r11d);
# (d) Push PrivUser(RIP ,CS,RSP ,SS) onto stack ,
# then perform control flow transfer
movq $PrivUserEnter , %r9;
pushq $PrivUserSS;
pushq %r11;
pushq $PrivUserCS;
pushq %r9;
lret;
# Entered from privret in PrivUser mode
LOTRExitGate:
sub $GateContextSize , %rsp
RESTORE_REGS ();
# in case security check (a) fails
EXIT:
lret;
Figure 2: Simplified pseudo assembly code of LOTRx86Enter
gates
the control flow transfers in the ABI – starting from a privcall
and its return to its caller.
privcall interface. A privcall (NR_PRIVCALL, ...) consists
of layers of macros that handle a variable number of arguments and
place them in the argument registers in order. After the arguments
are placed according to the x86-64 syscall ABI, a long call (lcall)
instruction is executed with a segment selector that points to the
Enter callgate as an argument. Upon the executing of lcall, the
execution continues at the Enter gate with a privilege of Ring1.
Enter gate. The LOTRx86 Enter gate plays a pivotal role in
safeguarding the user mode context that invoked a privcall into
the PrivUser mode. Figure 2 is a simplified pseudo assembly code
of the implementation. The Enter gate is written in assembly code
and is about 30 instructions that carry out three main operations.
First, the Enter gate checks the saved %cs in the gate stack. At
this point, the ring privilege has been escalated to that of the Gate
mode (Ring1), stack pointer now points to Gatemode stack, and the
caller context is saved in the new stack. (for detailed x86 callgate
operation, revisit Algorithm 1 in section 2). The least significant 2
bits of the saved %cs (%cs[1:0]) indicate the caller’s Ring privilege.
By ensuring the value to be 3, we prevent PrivUser mode from
entering the Enter gate for possibly malicious intent.
Then the gate saves the user mode caller context in the Gate
mode stack. Note that the x86 long call instruction has context
saving feature built in. However, since we use the Ring1 for both
Enter gate and Exit gate, the saved context is overwritten when
the context returns from PrivUser mode back to the Exit gate.
Therefore, we found that it is necessary to perform amanual context
saving of the four registers (%RIP, %CS, %RSP, %SS) in the beginning
of our Enter gate as shown in the code block (b) in Figure 2.
The second operation (code block (c) in Figure 2) illustrates
the transforming of the privcall arguments that follow the x86-
64 calling convention into that of the PrivUser mode ABI; the
in-register arguments must be transferred to the PrivUser mode
stack as preparation before entering the PrivUser mode. Unlike
the conventional x86-32 ABI, we use the 64-bit arguments in the
PrivUser mode by default. The fact that the PrivUser mode runs
in 32-bit compatibility mode but uses 64-bit length arguments is a
peculiar characteristic of our design, and the LOTRx86 Enter gate
resolves the calling convention discrepancy.
The last operation (code block (d)) performed in the Enter gate is
to transfer the control flow into the entry point of PrivUser mode.
We push the entry point address, the address of the PrivUsermode
stack that contains the arguments passed on by the privcall in the
user mode at this point, and their segments (%cs and %ss) on to the
current (Gate mode stack). Then, we execute the lret instruction
to enter the PrivUser mode.
PrivUser entry point. The PrivUser mode entry point first
performs a bound check on the %eax that contains the privcall
number (i.e., 1 ≤ nr_Privcall ≤ MAX_PRIVCALL). The pointers
to the predefined privcall routines are arranged in the Privuser
Call Table (PCT) whose role is identical to the system call table in
the Linux kernel. This mechanism prevents a maliciously crafted
privcall from calling an arbitrary memory address. If the check
is valid then the entry point calls the wrapper function for the
privcall routine that corresponds to the number is invoked.
PrivUser routine. The developers can define a privcall rou-
tine through the PRIVCALL_DEFINE(func_name,...) macro. The
macro creates and exports a wrapper function that calls the main
function. This particular implementation is borrowed from the
Linux kernel [40]. The wrapper casts the 64-bit arguments into
function-specific argument sizes (e.g., 64-bit to int (32bit)) for the
defined privcall routine. After the privcall routine is finished,
the execution returns to the PrivUser entry point to be concluded
by lcall that transfers the control flow back into the Exit gate with
the privilege of the Gate mode (Ring1).
Exit gate. The exit gate scrubs the scratch registers (the six
general purpose registers as stated in the System V i386 calling
convention) to prevent information leakage from the PrivUser
mode. Recall that we manually saved the user mode context in the
stack from the Enter gate. We subtract the stack pointer (48(8 × 6)
bytes in our implementation) to move it to the saved context. We
execute popq instruction to restore %rbp then the lret instruction
to restore %RIP, %CS, %RSP, %SS to return to the original caller of
the privcall with a privilege of user mode (Ring3).
5.3 Developing LOTRx86-enabled program
We developed tools and libraries that allow developers to write
LOTRx86-enabled program. Writing a privcall routine is similar
to writing a regular user-level code. However, there are a few key
differences both in developer’s perspective and underneath the
surface. Here, we outline the important aspects in LOTRx86-enabled
program development. Figure 3 illustrates the overall build process
of a LOTRx86-enabled executable.
The privcall interface and the development of privcall rou-
tines are intentionally modeled after the Linux kernel’s system
call interface. For this reason, the procedures for developing the
PrivUser side of the program and invoking them as necessary are
nearly identical to those of developing new system calls to the
kernel.
privcalldeclaration. liblotr provides two importantmacros
through <lotr/privuser.h>. First is the declaration macro #PRIV-
CALL_DEFINE. The macro takes the name of the function as the
first argument and up to six arguments. The type and the name of
the arguments must be entered as if they are separate arguments
(e.g., (int, mynumber)). This is because PRIVCALL_DEFINE generates
a wrapper function that casts the ABI-defined arguments into the ar-
gument’s type.We restrain from further explaining the details of the
macro since it is almost identical to the kernel’s SYSCALL_DEFINE
macro.
Compiling with lotr-libc.We provide gcc-lotr which is a
wrapper to the gcc compiler. gcc-lotr links the user’s PrivUser
code with lotr-libc instead of the default glibc (32bit). lotr-libc
is a modified version of musl-libc. We modified the malloc func-
tion in the musl-libc so that it manages a memory block from the
PrivUsermemory space S-pages. This is to prevent the by-products
or the application itself from being placed in a memory region ac-
cessible to the normal user mode. Additionally, we implemented a
function that initializes process Thread Local Storage (TLS) that can
be called from liblotr’s init_lotr() function. The initialization
of a process TLS is performed by the libc library before the pro-
gram’s main() is executed. Therefore, it is necessary to implement
a separate function to initialize the TLS for LOTRx86.
Argument passing. liblotr provides an argument page that
is always allocated within the 32-bit address space. Developers
can first copy the argument into the argument page then pass
the reference to PrivUser mode. Alternatively, developers can use
LOTR_SECRET keyword to global variables to force them to be placed
in a data section called .lotr_secret which is loaded into the
PrivUser memory space.
Building final exectuable. Compiling the PrivUser code with
our build tools yields two files: a header file in which privcall
numbers are defined, and a LOTRx86 object in .lotr extension. The
header file lists the assigned number for each declared privcall
routines, and the .lotr file is an object file ready to be linked to
the main program. Our build tool compiles the PrivUser code in
x86-32 code. However, we copy the sections of the 32-bit object into
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(a) Build PrivUser side to yield
 {Privcall header, Privcall object}
(c) Execute and initialize 
PrivUser space
lotr-libc
#include <lotr/privuser.h>
PRIVCALL_DEFINE(use_pkey){
    . . .
    return;
}
PRIVCALL_DEFINE(sec_acc){
    . . .
  
MyPrivUser.c
#include <lotr/liblotr.h>
#include “MyPrivCall.h”
int SignWithPKEY(){
    . . .
    privcall(PRIV_USE_PKEY);
    . . .
}
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Figure 3: Building LOTRx86 compatible executable
a new 64-bit ELF object format so that it can be linked into the main
program. The PrivUser build tools also strip all the symbols to
prevent symbol collision between the 32-bit libc (lotr-libc) and
the 64-bit libc used in the main program, then it generates a symbol
table that includes addresses of the PrivUser object sections and
most importantly, the PrivUser entry point. The main program
is built with our linker script (LOTR.linkerscript) that loads the
symbol table generated during PrivUser build. When the main
program launches, init_lotr() fetches the symbols and transfers
them to lotr-kmod, and the kernel module marks the memory
pages that belong to the PrivUser memory space S-pages.
5.4 Kernel changes
The LOTRx86 prototype is implemented as a kernel module. How-
ever, we also made minor but necessary modifications to the Linux
kernel. First of all, we made sure that system calls (e.g., mprotect)
that alter the memory permissions of the user memory space ignore
the request when the affected region includes PrivUser-memory.
This is achieved by simply placing a “if-then-return -ERR” state-
ment for the case where the address belongs to the user-space but
the page is an S-page. We made a similar change to the munlock
system call so that PrivUser’s P-pages are excluded from possible
memory swap-outs.
6 PROOF-OF-CONCEPT AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
To show the feasibility and efficiency of the LOTRx86 architecture
approach, we develop a proof-of-concept (PoC) by incorporating
our architecture into the Nginx web server [25] as well as the Li-
breSSL [39] that is used by the web browser to support SSL. We
modified the parts of the web server to protect the in-memory pri-
vate key in the PrivUsermemory space and only allow accesses to
the key through our privcall interface. In this section, we present
the results from a set of microbenchmarks that we performed to
measure the latency induced by a privcall. Then we compare the
performance of the PoC web server whose private key is protected
with its original version. Our experiments are conducted on both
Intel and AMD to show that our approach to show that our ap-
proach is portable. It should be noted that the PoC and all examples
are compiled as 64-bit programs. The specifications of the two x86
machines are as follows:
Intel-based PC: i7-4770 @ 3.40GHz, 4 cores, 16GB RAM
AMD-based PC: Ryzen 7 1800X @ 3.60GHZ, 8 cores, 32GB RAM
OS on both PC: Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, kernel version 4.13
6.1 Microbenchmarks
The privcall allows developers to invoke routines that access ap-
plication secrets in the PrivUser layer. A certain amount of added
latency is inevitable since we perform a chain of control transfers
to securely invoke the privcall routines. In this experiment, we
compare the latency of an empty privcall against the commonly
used library calls to show that the added overhead is indeed a rea-
sonable trade-off for the protection of application secrets. We also
conducted the microbenchmark in two varying setups. In the first
setup, we built executables that make a single invocation of each
call (privcalls, library calls), and we produced the results by exe-
cuting the executables 1000 times. In the second setup, we measure
the latency of a 1000 consecutive invocations of each call in a loop.
These two setups represent the two situations where privcall is
infrequently called and frequently called.
Figure 4a shows the experiment results on the Intel PC while Fig-
ure 4b shows the results from the same experiment on the AMD PC.
The latency incurred by a privcall proves to be at a reasonable
level. The single invocation performance is on par with the most
basic library calls such as ioctl or gettid, consuming around
1000-1500 cycles on both PCs. It is noticeable that the latency of a
privcall does not improve drastically as some of the other calls
such as gettid whose number of cycles has dropped from 1575 to
1044 on Intel PC. As to this result, we surmise that the control flow
transfer chain used in our architecture affect the caching behavior
of the processor negatively. Also, the libc and kernel’s system call
invocation have been extremely well optimized for a long period of
time. Hence, we plan to investigate possible optimizations that can
be applied to LOTRx86 in future. However, LOTRx86 is the only
portable solution on the x86 architecture that achieves in-process
memory protection. Also, it is the most efficient solution among
portable solutions. We present a comparison of LOTRx86 against
the traditional memory protection techniques to support our claim.
Moreover, we argue that the performance overhead of LOTRx86 is
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methods (c,d)
at a reasonable level in an application scale. We present the macro
benchmark results using our PoC (Nginx with LOTRx86).
6.2 Comparison with traditional memory
protection techniques
We implemented a simple demonstration in-process memory pro-
tection using LOTRx86, page table manipulation technique im-
plemented with mmap and mprotect, and a socket-based remote
procedure call mechniasm (from <rpc/rpc.h>).
Test program. Our simple program first load a password from a
file into the protected memory region, then it receives an input from
the user via stdin to compare it against the protected password.
In more detail, we implemented two functions load_password
and check_password using the three protection mechanisms to
evaluate their performance overhead. For page table based method,
we use mprotect to set the page that contains the load_password
and check_password and the page dedicated for storing the loaded
password to PROT_NONE. In case of the RPC mechanism, we simply
place the two measured functions and the password-storing buffer
in a different process and make RPCs to execute the functions
remotely.
Performance overhead comparison. The measurements for
the execution time of the two functions, implemented with three
different mechanisms, are illustrated in Figure 4. We averaged the
results from 1000 trials (the y-axis is in log scale). The results
show that LOTRx86 proves to be much faster than the two tra-
ditional methods by a large margin. On Intel PC, LOTRx86 greatly
reduces the execution time (33051 cycles) of load_password by
83.11% (195661 cycles) and by 97.93% (1600291 cycles), compared to
mmap and RPC-based implementation, respectively. This is because
LOTRx86 does not require page table modifications that may cause
system-wide performance overhead, nor the cost of communication
with an external entity.
6.3 LOTRx86-enabled web server
To develop a proof-of-concept LOTRx86-enabled web server, we
made changes to LibreSSL and the Nginx web browser. Specifically,
we replaced parts of the software that accesses private keys with a
privcall routine that performs the equivalent task. In the resulting
web server’s process address space, the private key always resides
in the PrivUser memory space. Therefore, any arbitrary memory
access (e.g., buffer over-read in HeartBleed) are thwarted. Only
through the pre-defined privcall routines, the web server can
perform operations that involve the private key.
Implementation. During its initialization, Nginx loads the pri-
vate key through a function called SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file.
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Figure 5: SSL KeepAlive response latency with varying file sizes on LOTRx86-enabled Nginx
This function performs a series of operations to read the private
key then parsing the contents into an ASN1 structure, then the
function eventually produces an RSA structure that is used by Li-
breSSL during SSL connections. We re-implemented the function
using privcalls. In our version of the function, the opening of
the file and loading its contents into memory are performed in
PrivUser mode and the structures that contain the private key or
its processed forms, are stored in the PrivUser memory space. For
passing arguments, we created a custom C structure that contains
the necessary information that needs to be passed via privcalls.
Once the private key is converted into an RSA data structure, it is
stored safely in the PrivUser memory space until it needs to be
accessed during the handshake stage in an SSL connection. During
the handshake, the server digitally signs a message using the private
key to authenticate itself to its client. We modified the RSA_sign()
such that it makes privcalls to request operations involving the
RSA structure. In more detail, we copy the message to be signed in
the argument page shared between user mode and PrivUser mode
that is designated by liblotr.
Performance measurements.We used the ab apache bench-
mark tool to perform a benchmark similar to the one performed
in [35], a work that leverages hypervisor to achieve a similar objec-
tive to LOTRx86. Using the tool, we make 1000 KeepAlive requests
to the server, then the server responds by sending a file back to the
client. In the benchmark, we measured the average execution time
from the socket connection to the last response from the server. We
also varied the size of the requested file size to represent different
configurations. (we used {1k, 5k, 20k, 50k, 100k, 500k} and [35] uses
{5k,20k,50k}). The results are shown in Figure 5a and Figure 5b. Note
that due to the difference of CPU performance, the range of y-axes
is different.
The additional performance overhead due to LOTRx86 mainly
comes from the execution mode transition (user mode to PrivUser
mode). A total of three privcall invocations are made in opening
and loading the contents of the private key file into a buffer in
PrivUser memory space, and a single privcall to sign the mes-
sage using the private key. In case of 5K requested file size, a rather
extreme case, LOTRx86 adds about 35% on Intel processor and 40%
on AMD. However, the overhead becomes relatively irrelevant as
the file size increases: 20K: 29.36% (Intel), 16.07% (AMD), 500K :
6.25% (Intel) 0% (AMD). This particular experiment tests the fea-
sibility of LOTRx86 in latency-critical tasks, and the results show
that our approach is feasible even in such cases.
7 RELATEDWORK
The LOTRx86 architecture creates a new protected domain in user-
space using only the existing features through its unique design.
LOTRx86 can be a practical alternative to the recently introduced
hardware security features when the software must be deployed
to general users. In this section, we discuss previous work on user-
space memory protection and system privilege restructuring meth-
ods for system fortification.
Alternative PrivilegeModels:Nested kernel [18] introduced a
concept of inner-kernel that takes control of the hardware MMU by
deprivileging the original kernel by disabling a subset of its Ring0
power; By removing all privileged instruction that may disable
memory protection, Nested Kernel protects itself and the kernel
memory mappings. Nested Kernel exports virtual MMU interface
that allows the deprivileged kernel to request sensitive memory
management operation explicitly.
Dune leveraged the Intel VT-x virtualization technology to pro-
vide user-level programs with privileged system functionalities
that were only allowed to kernels [5]. Dune migrates a user-level
process in Ring 0 of the VT-x non-root mode, allowing the process
to enjoy kernel privileges securely. This process in Dune Mode is
dependent on the host kernel, and makes hypercalls to invoke the
root-mode kernel system calls.
The x86-32 hypervisor implementation before the introduction
of Intel’s hardware-assisted virtualization features such as Intel’s
VT-x and AMD’s SVM [2, 27], made use of the intermediate Rings
and segmentation to achieve virtualization. Hypervisor implementa-
tions [3, 8, 17] deprivileged the operating system kernel by making
them run in the intermediate Rings then enforced segmentation to
protect the in-memory hypervisor. LOTR-x86 not only explores the
use of the intermediate Rings on 64-bit operating systems but also
for a different purpose. Our architecture inhabits the abandoned
Rings into more privileged user-mode in which developers can
place their sensitive application code and data.
Use of processor features: Some works employed the x86-
32 segmentation feature for application memory protection [22,
47](and as aforementioned in early hypervisor implementations).
Both Native Client(NaCl) and Vx32 provide a safe is a user-level
sandbox that enables safe execution of guest plug-ins to the host
program. In this regard, the attack model of these work differs from
that of LOTR-x86. LOTR-x86 assumes that the host application is un-
trusted and we place sensitive code and data in the PrivUser-space.
Also, The Nacl sandbox has adopted SFI to compensate for the lack
of segmentation in x86-64 [42]. LOTR-x86 enables inescapable in-
place segmentation enforcement to construct the PrivUser-mode
in x86-64.
Processor architectures have been extended to support user-
space memory protection. Intel has recently introduced Software
Guard eXtensions (SGX) that creates an enclave which a predefined
set of code and data can be protected [14]. It also provides new in-
structions to invoke the code residing in the enclave. Furthermore,
Intel has been planning for the release of SGX version 2 that will
support dynamic memory management [26]. Intel also ships mem-
ory bound checking functionality called MPX [15], which provides
hardware assist for bound checking that software fault isolation ap-
proaches advocated. Intel has also disclosed plans for domain-based
memory partitioning that resembles the memory domain feature in
the ARM architecture. More recently AMD has published a white
paper describing the upcoming memory encryption feature to be
added to its x86 processors [19].
The fragmented hardware support for application-level memory
protection served as a central motivation for our approach. Our
design does not rely on any specific hardware feature and preserves
portability. However, there are differences in the attack model and
security guarantees. SGX distrusts kernel and the protected user
memory within its enclave stays intact even under kernel compro-
mise. On the other hand, LOTR-x86 is incapable of operating in a
trustworthy way when the kernel is compromised. Nevertheless,
we argue that our work presents a unique approach that achieves
in-process memory protection while preserving portability.
Process/thread level partitioning: Early work on application
privilege separation focused on restructuring a program into sepa-
rate processes [7, 29, 41, 47]. In essence, placing program compo-
nents into process-level partitions aims to achieve complete address
space separation. Process-level partitioning provides architecturally
(processor and kernel implementation) enforced separation, the ap-
proach presents many disadvantages. First, the approach inevitably
involves a Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanism to estab-
lish a communication channel between the partitions so that they
can remotely invoke functions (i.e., Remote Procedure Calls (RPC))
in other partitions and pass arguments as necessary.
The endeavor for in-application privilege separation continued,
and more recent work used threads as a unit of separation com-
partment that prevents leakage of sensitive memory [6, 24, 28, 44].
Chen et al. [11] pointed out that even the thread compartments are
still too coarse-grained, introduce a high-performance overhead
due to page table switches, and requires developers to make struc-
tural changes to their program. Their work Shreds takes advantage
of the memory domain feature on the ARM architecture to create
a secure code block within the program. However, the Domain-
based memory partitioning is only available has been deprecated
on AARCH64.
Our approach is fundamentally different from the previous work;
the process and thread-level protection retrofit the protection mech-
anisms that are supported by the operating system kernel. However,
our approach creates a new privilege layer in between the user and
the kernel for the protection of sensitive application code and data.
Another significant difference is that our approach does not require
address space switch nor run-time page table modifications. In our
design, the privilege is what changes when granting access to the
protected memory through privcall; the page tables that map
the protected memory region as S-pages are intact whether the
running context is in the normal user-mode or PrivUser-mode.
Hypervisor-basedApproaches:Anumber ofworks have lever-
aged hypervisors to protect applications in virtualized systems.
memory [10, 23, 31, 33, 35, 37, 46]. Hypervisor-based approaches
leverage hypervisor-controlled page tables and other hypervisor
control over the virtualized system to ensure trustworthiness of
applications and system services. Similar to SGX, hypervisor-based
approaches are designed on the premise that kernel is vulnerable
or possibly malicious. Additionally, these works assume the pres-
ence of a hypervisor on the system. On the contrary, we propose a
portable solution that does not require special hardware features
nor virtualization technologies.
Address-based isolation. Software-based fault isolation tech-
niques [21, 22, 36, 38, 42, 43, 47] employ software techniques such
as compilers or instrumentation to create logical fault domains
within the same address space often to contain code execution or
memory access. SFI is often used to partition an untrusted module
into a sandbox to protect the host program [22, 38, 42, 47]. The
aforementioned Intel’s MPX technology incorporates hardware
support for address-based isolation techniques.
Address-based isolation techniques can protect application se-
crets by applying bound checking to program’s load and store
instructions that can potentially access the sensitive memory ad-
dresses [9]. On the other hand, LOTRx86 creates a a protected do-
main called PrivUser that consists of an isolatedmemory space and
execution mode. direct performance comparison between address-
based and domain-based techniques can be difficult. For instance,
address-based isolation techniques often require strong CFI de-
fenses to be in place [9, 30] while LOTRx86 (and similar domain)
includes a controlled control transfer between the two domains.
8 LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
LOTRx86 proposes a novel approach to application memory protec-
tion. However, the architecture is still in its infancy. We describe the
limitations of the current prototype and discuss issues that needs
to be addressed.
SMEP/SMAP. Intel’s SMEP and SMAP [27] prevents supervi-
sor mode (Ring0-2) to access or execute U-pages. SMEP does not
affect LOTRx86 since PrivUser does not execute any code in u-
pages. However, SMAP prevents PrivUser mode from accessing
the argument page shared with user mode. One possible solution
is to implement a system call or an ioctl call that toggles the
SMAP enforcement such that PrivUser mode can fetch data from
the shared page. Note that kernel’s copy_from_user API also tem-
porarily disables SMAP to copy from user-supplied pointer to the
argument.
Argument passing.The current prototype of LOTRx86 requires
the arguments to the PrivUser routines to be placed in the shared
argument page in the 32-bit address space so that they can be ac-
cessed in PrivUser mode. Providing high-level APIs that facilitate
convenient argument passing to the PrivUser of one of our most
important future works. Another limitation that comes from the
bitness difference is that the PrivUser execution mode is incapable
of traversing the (64-bit) pointers. Nevertheless, we wish to point
out that sharing complex objects across the untrusted and isolated
domains is generally discouraged. That is, we advise developers to
clearly define the necessary input to the privcall routines so that
the routines do not need to traverse pointers any further than the
ones that are passed as pass-by-reference arguments.
Further optimization.We believe there is a room for further
optimizations for the LOTRx86 architecture. However, finding re-
sourceful optimization guides for using the intermediate Rings were
absent due to their rare usage in modern operating systems. How-
ever, we plan to investigate further to improve the performance of
our architecture.
9 CONCLUSION
We presented LOTRx86, a novel approach that establishes a new
user privilege layer called PrivUser that protects and safeguards se-
cure access to application secrets. The new PrivUsermemory space
is protected from user mode access. We introduced the privcall in-
terface that provides user mode a controlled invocation mechanism
of the PrivUser routines to securely perform operations involving
application secrets. Our design introduced a unique privilege and
control transfer structures that establish a new user mode privilege.
We also explained how our design satisfies the security require-
ments for the PrivUser layer to have a distinct execution mode
and memory space. In our evaluation, we showed that the latency
added by a privcall is on par with frequently used C function
calls such as ioctl and malloc. We also implemented and evalu-
ated the LOTRx86-enabled Nginx web server that securely accesses
its private key through the privcall interface. Using the Apache
ab server benchmark tool, we measured the average keep-alive
response time of the server to find the average overhead incurred
by LOTRx86 in various response file size. The average overhead is
limited to 30.40% on the Intel processor and 20.19% on the AMD
processor.
10 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable com-
ments and feedback that helped us improve our paper. This work
was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF) through funding for the Center for IT-Security,
Privacy and Accountability (CISPA). This work was also supported
by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research
Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT
& Future Planning (NRF-2017R1A2B3006360).
REFERENCES
[1] 2018. musl libc. https://www.musl-libc.org. (2018). Last accessed Jan 23, 2018.
[2] AMD 2013. AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual. AMD.
[3] Paul Barham, Boris Dragovic, Keir Fraser, Steven Hand, Tim Harris, Alex Ho,
Rolf Neugebauer, Ian Pratt, and Andrew Warfield. 2003. Xen and the art of
virtualization. In Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating
systems principles (SOSP ’03). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 164–177. https://doi.
org/10.1145/945445.945462
[4] Andrew Baumann,Marcus Peinado, and GalenHunt. 2015. Shielding Applications
from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 33, 3, Article 8
(Aug. 2015), 26 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/2799647
[5] Adam Belay, Andrea Bittau, Ali Mashtizadeh, David Terei, David Mazières, and
Christos Kozyrakis. 2012. Dune: Safe User-level Access to Privileged CPU Fea-
tures. In Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Conference on Operating Systems Design
and Implementation (OSDI’12). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 335–348.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2387880.2387913
[6] Andrea Bittau, Petr Marchenko, Mark Handley, and Brad Karp. 2008. Wedge:
Splitting Applications into Reduced-privilege Compartments. In Proceedings of
the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
(NSDI’08). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 309–322. http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=1387589.1387611
[7] David Brumley and Dawn Song. 2004. Privtrans: Automatically Partitioning
Programs for Privilege Separation. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on USENIX
Security Symposium - Volume 13 (SSYM’04). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA,
USA, 5–5. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1251375.1251380
[8] Edouard Bugnion, Scott Devine, Mendel Rosenblum, Jeremy Sugerman, and
Edward Y. Wang. 2012. Bringing Virtualization to the x86 Architecture with the
Original VMware Workstation. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 30, 4, Article 12 (Nov.
2012), 51 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/2382553.2382554
[9] Scott A. Carr and Mathias Payer. 2017. DataShield: Configurable Data Confi-
dentiality and Integrity. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS ’17). ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 193–204. https://doi.org/10.1145/3052973.3052983
[10] Xiaoxin Chen, Tal Garfinkel, E. Christopher Lewis, Pratap Subrahmanyam, Carl A.
Waldspurger, Dan Boneh, Jeffrey Dwoskin, and Dan R.K. Ports. 2008. Over-
shadow: A Virtualization-based Approach to Retrofitting Protection in Com-
modity Operating Systems. SIGPLAN Not. 43, 3 (March 2008), 2–13. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/1353536.1346284
[11] Y. Chen, S. Reymondjohnson, Z. Sun, and L. Lu. 2016. Shreds: Fine-Grained
Execution Units with Private Memory. In 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP). 56–71. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2016.12
[12] Jonathan Corbet. 2012. Supervisor mode access prevention. https://lwn.net/
Articles/517475/. (2012).
[13] Jonathan Corbet. 2015. Memory protection keys. https://lwn.net/Articles/643797/.
(2015).
[14] Intel Corperation. 2018. Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX). https:
//software.intel.com/en-us/sgx. (2018). Last accessed Feb 27 , 2018,.
[15] Intel Corperation. 2018. Introduction to Intel® Memory Pro-
tection Extensions. https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/
introduction-to-intel-memory-protection-extensions. (2018). Last accessed Feb
22 , 2018,.
[16] Intel Corperation. 2018. System V Application Binary Interface. https://software.
intel.com/sites/default/files/article/402129/mpx-linux64-abi.pdf. (2018). Last
accessed Feb 21 , 2018,.
[17] Oracle Corporation. 2017. VirtualBox Technical documentation. https://www.
virtualbox.org/wiki/Technical_documentation. (2017). Last accessed Aug 23,
2017.
[18] Nathan Dautenhahn, Theodoros Kasampalis, Will Dietz, John Criswell, and
Vikram Adve. 2015. Nested Kernel: An Operating System Architecture for Intra-
Kernel Privilege Separation. SIGARCH Comput. Archit. News 43, 1 (March 2015),
191–206. https://doi.org/10.1145/2786763.2694386
[19] Tom Woller David Kaplan, Jeremy Powell. 2016. White Paper: AMD Memory
Encryption. AMD.
[20] Zakir Durumeric, James Kasten, David Adrian, J. Alex Halderman, Michael Bailey,
Frank Li, Nicolas Weaver, Johanna Amann, Jethro Beekman, Mathias Payer, and
Vern Paxson. 2014. TheMatter of Heartbleed. In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference
on Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 475–488.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2663716.2663755
[21] Úlfar Erlingsson, Martín Abadi, Michael Vrable, Mihai Budiu, and George C.
Necula. 2006. XFI: Software Guards for System Address Spaces. In Proceedings of
the 7th Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI ’06).
USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 75–88. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=1298455.1298463
[22] Bryan Ford and Russ Cox. 2008. Vx32: Lightweight User-level Sandboxing on the
x86. In USENIX 2008 Annual Technical Conference (ATC’08). USENIX Association,
Berkeley, CA, USA, 293–306. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1404014.1404039
[23] Owen S. Hofmann, Sangman Kim, Alan M. Dunn, Michael Z. Lee, and Emmett
Witchel. 2013. InkTag: Secure Applications on an Untrusted Operating System.
SIGPLAN Not. 48, 4 (March 2013), 265–278. https://doi.org/10.1145/2499368.
2451146
[24] Terry Ching-Hsiang Hsu, Kevin Hoffman, Patrick Eugster, and Mathias Payer.
2016. Enforcing Least Privilege Memory Views for Multithreaded Applications. In
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 393–405. https://doi.org/10.1145/
2976749.2978327
[25] NGINX Inc. 2018. Nginx. https://www.nginx.com. (2018). Last accessed Feb 27 ,
2018,.
[26] INTEL 2014. Intel Software Guard Extensions Programming Reference. INTEL.
[27] Intel Corporation. 2016. Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s
Manual. Number 325462-061US.
[28] Seny Kamara, Payman Mohassel, and Ben Riva. 2012. Salus: A System for Server-
aided Secure Function Evaluation. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’12). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
797–808. https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.2382280
[29] Douglas Kilpatrick. 2003. Privman: A Library for Partitioning Applications..
In USENIX Annual Technical Conference, FREENIX Track (2003-09-03). USENIX,
273–284. http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/usenix/usenix2003f.html#Kilpatrick03
[30] Koen Koning, Xi Chen, Herbert Bos, Cristiano Giuffrida, and Elias Athanasopou-
los. 2017. No Need to Hide: Protecting Safe Regions on Commodity Hardware. In
Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys ’17).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 437–452. https://doi.org/10.1145/3064176.3064217
[31] Youngjin Kwon, Alan M. Dunn, Michael Z. Lee, Owen S. Hofmann, Yuanzhong
Xu, and Emmett Witchel. 2016. Sego: Pervasive Trusted Metadata for Efficiently
Verified Untrusted System Services. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 50, 2 (March 2016),
277–290. https://doi.org/10.1145/2954680.2872372
[32] Jaehyuk Lee, Jinsoo Jang, Yeongjin Jang, Nohyun Kwak, Yeseul Choi, Changho
Choi, Taesoo Kim, Marcus Peinado, and Brent ByungHoon Kang. 2017. Hack-
ing in Darkness: Return-oriented Programming against Secure Enclaves. In
26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 17). USENIX Association,
Vancouver, BC, 523–539. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/
technical-sessions/presentation/lee-jaehyuk
[33] Yanlin Li, Jonathan McCune, James Newsome, Adrian Perrig, Brandon Baker,
and Will Drewry. 2014. MiniBox: A Two-Way Sandbox for x86 Native Code.
In 2014 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 14). USENIX Asso-
ciation, Philadelphia, PA, 409–420. https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc14/
technical-sessions/presentation/li_yanlin
[34] ARM Limited. 2009. Building a Secure System using TrustZoneÂő Tech-
nolog. http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.prd29-genc-009492c/
PRD29-GENC-009492C_trustzone_security_whitepaper.pdf. (2009).
[35] Yutao Liu, Tianyu Zhou, Kexin Chen, Haibo Chen, and Yubin Xia. 2015. Thwart-
ing Memory Disclosure with Efficient Hypervisor-enforced Intra-domain Iso-
lation. In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS ’15). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1607–1619.
https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813690
[36] Stephen McCamant and Greg Morrisett. 2006. Evaluating SFI for a CISC Archi-
tecture. In Proceedings of the 15th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium -
Volume 15 (USENIX-SS’06). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, Article 15.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1267336.1267351
[37] J. M. McCune, Y. Li, N. Qu, Z. Zhou, A. Datta, V. Gligor, and A. Perrig. 2010.
TrustVisor: Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy. 143–158. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.17
[38] Greg Morrisett, Gang Tan, Joseph Tassarotti, Jean-Baptiste Tristan, and Edward
Gan. 2012. RockSalt: Better, Faster, Stronger SFI for the x86. In Proceedings
of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation (PLDI ’12). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 395–404. https://doi.org/
10.1145/2254064.2254111
[39] OpenBSD. 2017. LibreSSL. http://www.libressl.org. (2017). Last accessed Feb 27 ,
2018,.
[40] Linux Kernel Organization. 2018. The Linux Kernel Archives. https://www.
kernel.org. (2018). Last accessed April 2 , 2018,.
[41] Niels Provos, Markus Friedl, and Peter Honeyman. 2003. Preventing Privilege
Escalation. In Proceedings of the 12th Conference on USENIX Security Symposium
- Volume 12 (SSYM’03). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 16–16. http:
//dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1251353.1251369
[42] David Sehr, Robert Muth, Cliff Biffle, Victor Khimenko, Egor Pasko, Karl Schimpf,
Bennet Yee, and Brad Chen. 2010. Adapting Software Fault Isolation to Con-
temporary CPU Architectures. In Proceedings of the 19th USENIX Conference
on Security (USENIX Security’10). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 1–1.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1929820.1929822
[43] Robert Wahbe, Steven Lucco, Thomas E. Anderson, and Susan L. Graham. 1993.
Efficient Software-based Fault Isolation. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM
Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP ’93). ACM, New York, NY, USA,
203–216. https://doi.org/10.1145/168619.168635
[44] Jun Wang, Xi Xiong, and Peng Liu. 2015. Between Mutual Trust and Mutual
Distrust: Practical Fine-grained Privilege Separation in Multithreaded Applica-
tions. In Proceedings of the 2015 USENIX Conference on Usenix Annual Technical
Conference (USENIX ATC ’15). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 361–373.
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2813767.2813794
[45] D. A. Wheeler. 2014. Preventing Heartbleed. Computer 47, 8 (Aug 2014), 80–83.
https://doi.org/10.1109/MC.2014.217
[46] Jisoo Yang and Kang G. Shin. 2008. Using Hypervisor to Provide Data Secrecy
for User Applications on a Per-page Basis. In Proceedings of the Fourth ACM
SIGPLAN/SIGOPS International Conference on Virtual Execution Environments (VEE
’08). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 71–80. https://doi.org/10.1145/1346256.1346267
[47] Bennet Yee, David Sehr, Gregory Dardyk, J. Bradley Chen, Robert Muth, Tavis
Ormandy, Shiki Okasaka, Neha Narula, and Nicholas Fullagar. 2009. Native Client:
A Sandbox for Portable, Untrusted x86 Native Code. In Proceedings of the 2009
30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP ’09). IEEE Computer Society,
Washington, DC, USA, 79–93. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2009.25
